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THE RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT-OWNERS UNDER ZEROTOLERANCE ANTI-DOPING HORSE RACING REGULATIONS AS
EXPLAINED IN PIERCE v. TEXAS RACING COMMISSION
DONALD SMITH
I. INTRODUCTION

Doping in horse racing is a growing area of concern and regulation.
Tough policies, including so-called "zero-tolerance policies," provide a
framework for regulating the horse racing industry. Such fervent regulation
raises concerns for people with vested interests in horse racing. Therefore,
procedural safeguards are necessary to protect these interests. These
protections are incorporated into agency procedures, statutes, judicial
review, and constitutional rights.
Unfortunately, these procedural
safeguards are often inadequate.
In Pierce v. Texas Racing Commission,' a Defendant-owner,
Appellant, was penalized for violation of the anti-doping regulations under
the Texas zero-tolerance framework. On review, the Texas Court of
Appeals intended to clarify: (1) whether the Texas Racing Commission
(hereinafter "Commission") had reached a justifiable result within the
procedural framework created for the agency's regulation, and (2) whether
Appellant's constitutional rights of due process and equal protection were
violated by the Commission. This Comment analyzes statutory and
constitutional rights of a defendant-owner in a zero-tolerance anti-doping
framework, as interpreted by the Texas Court of Appeals in Pierce.
Section II of this Comment presents the legal background relevant
to the decision in Pierce. Section III provides the procedural history
through the agency's findings and judicial review. Section IV analyzes the
competing claims and the rationale of the Texas Court of Appeals in
reaching its holding. Section V concludes with the implications of the
Pierceholding for defendant-owners of racing horses.

1Pierce v. Texas Racing Comm'n, 212 S.W.3d 745 (Tex. App. 2006).
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Texas AdministrativeCode §§319.361 - 362: Testing of Horses
Section 319.361 of the Texas Administrative Code supplies the
guidelines for horse testing. In Pierce, Appellant's racehorse was tested
pursuant to the stewards' discretionary authority under (c)(1), as indicated
below:
(a) The stewards shall order specimens collected for
testing under this subchapter in accordance with this
section.
(b) A specimen shall be collected from each horse that
finishes first in a race.
(c) In addition to the horse designated under subsection
(b) of this section, a specimen may be collected from
the following horses:
2
(1) a horse that finishes second[.]

After the horses are chosen for sampling, pursuant to Texas Administrative
Code Section 319.361, then Section 319.362 provides detailed instructions
for "split specimen ' 3 testing. Subsections (e) and (f) provide guidance for
the probative value of positive test results:
(e) If the test on the split specimen confirms the findings of
the original laboratory, it is a prima facie violation of the
applicable
provisions
of
the
chapter.
(f) If the test on the split specimen portion does not
substantially confirm the findings of the original
laboratory, the stewards may not take disciplinary action
regarding the original test results.4

2 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 319.361 (2009).

3 The split specimen method seeks to protect the integrity of the samples against false
positives and other discrepancies. See 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 319.362 (2009).
4 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 319.362 (e)-(f) (2009).
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B. Texas Revised Civil Statutes Article 179E, " Texas Racing
Act" § 3.16(H)
The following provision of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes was a key
component of the Appellant's argument:
(h) The licensed trainer of an animal is:
(1) considered by law to be the absolute
ensurer that no prohibited substance has
been administered to the animal; and
(2) responsible for ensuring that no
prohibited substance is administered to the
animal.5
This provision creates a form of strict liability for the trainer of a
horse and serves as the basis of Appellant's argument that only the
trainer should be held liable.
C. Texas Government Code § 2001.058(E):HearingConducted by
SOAH
Section 2001.058(e) of the Texas Government Code applies to the
Racing Commission's ability to modify conclusions of law or findings of
fact made by the Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter "AL") at the State
Office of Administrative Hearings (hereinafter "SOAH"):
(e) A state agency may change a finding of fact or
conclusion of law made by the administrative law judge, or
may vacate or modify an order issued by the administrative
judge, only if the agency determines:
(1) that the administrative law judge did
not properly apply or interpret applicable
law, agency rules, written policies
provided under Subsection (c), or prior
administrative decisions;

' TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 179e, §3.16(h) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
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(2) that a prior administrative decision on
which the administrative law judge relied
is incorrect or should be changed; or
(3) that a technical error in a finding of fact
should be changed.
The agency shall state in writing the specific reason and
legal basis for a change made under this subsection.6
D. 16 Texas Administrative Code § 307.36: Considerationby the
Commission
The following provision clarifies the general rule for agency
discretion to modify an ALJ's conclusions and findings with specific
guidelines for the Racing Commission:
(a) After the deadline for filing exceptions and replies, the
proposal for decision will be considered by the
Commission at open meeting.
(b) The Commission may:
(1) adopt the proposal for decision, in
whole or in part;
(2) decline to adopt the proposal for
decision, in whole or in part; or
(3) remand the proceeding to SOAH and
direct the ALJ to give further
consideration to the proceeding with or
without reopening the hearing.7
E. 16 Texas Administrative Code § 307.67(C), (E): Appeal
to the Commission
The following provisions of Section 307.67 formed the basis for
Appellant's constitutional challenge to the practice of shifting the burden of
proof on appeal and for the Commission's argument as to whether the purse
was Appellant's property right:
TEX. GOVT CODE ANN. § 2001.058(e) (Vernon 2008).
7 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 307.36 (a)-(b) (2009).
6
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(c) Hearing Procedure. A hearing on an appeal from a
ruling by the stewards or racing judges is a contested
case and shall be conducted by SOAH in accordance
with the Rules regarding contested cases. In an appeal,
the appellant has the burden to prove that the stewards'
or racing judges' decision was clearly in error.
(e) Effect of Appeal on Purse Payment. If a ruling that
affects the outcome of a race is appealed, the portion of
the purse that is involved in the appeal shall be withheld
and not distributed. The stewards or racing judges may
distribute the portion of the purse that is not involved in
or affected by the outcome of the appeal.8
F. The 14 th Amendment of the United States Constitution
In Pierce, Appellant argued that the process used by the Racing
Commission violated his rights under the 14th Amendment, which reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.9
This section of the 14t Amendment contains the Due Process Clause and
the Equal Protection Clause, both of which Appellant claims were violated
by the Commission's procedures.
III. CASE HISTORY
In Pierce v. Texas Racing Commission, John Pierce, Appellant, was
the owner of a racehorse named Kristy's Gold Star.10 The filly placed
second in a race at Lone Star Park for a $28,408 purse." After the race,
blood and urine samples were taken from the horse 12 pursuant to Texas
Administrative Code Section 319.361. "The urine sample tested positive
8 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 307.67(c), (e) (2009).
9U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
0Pierce v. Texas Racing Comm'n, 212 S.W.3d 745, 749 (Tex. App. 2006).

" Id.at 750 n.3.
12Id.at 749.
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for ipratropium, a Class 3 prohibited drug."' 3 The positive result was
confirmed by testing the split sample. 14 Ipratropium was medically
warranted for bronchitis treatment and was administered 25 hours prior to
the race by the treating veterinarian.' 5 In general, Ipratropium "has a
standard withdrawal time of 24 hours, and is only... effective for about six
hours.' 6 Despite these attenuating circumstances, the positive testing for
violation pursuant to Section 319.362 of the
ipratropium was a prima facie
17
Texas Administrative Code.
Richard Duhon, the trainer, was notified by the racing stewards of8
test and of the upcoming hearing to determine the penalty.'
positive
the
Whether Pierce, the owner, had notice of the stewards' hearing was more
convoluted. The stewards' investigative report stated that on June 20, 2002,
an investigator with the Commission called Pierce's office and left a
message on his answering machine.' 9 The next day, the same investigator
called Pierce and notified him of the positive test, of which Pierce had
already been informed by the trainer.20 Pierce confirmed in his testimony
that he knew the day and time of the hearing, but chose to attend a
scheduled root canal instead. 2' Unaware that a postponement was possible,
he did not request that the hearing be postponed.2 2 The presiding steward
testified that he would have granted a continuance. 23 This testimony on
Pierce's notice was relevant to the Court's due process analysis.
The trainer attended the "stewards' hearing, but Pierce did not. 24
Two days later, the formal ruling was issued, "assess[ing] a fine of $500
against the trainer[ ] and suspend[ing] his license for 15 days. 25 In
addition, Pierce's racehorse was declared disqualified and unplaced, and the
stewards ordered the purse to be redistributed.2 6
Pierce appealed the ruling unplacing the horse and redistributing
the purse.27 He was granted a hearing before an ALJ at the SOAH.2 8 The
ALJ issued her Proposal for Decision (hereinafter "PFD") in which she
upheld the stewards' finding that the rules had been violated. However, the
14id.
" Id. at 756.
16id.
Id. at 763; 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 319.3(f) (2009); See 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §

17

319.362(e) (2009).
8
Pierce,212 S.W.3d at 749.
9
' Id. at 759.
20 Id.
21 Id.
2 id.

231id.
24
Id. at 750.
25 Id.

26

id.

27 Id.

28 See

id.

2009-2010]

PIERCE V. TEXAS RACING COMMISSION

ALJ recommended, as conclusion of law 11, to decrease Pierce's penalty
"'based on convincing evidence that the veterinarian administered the
ipratropium in a manner that did not affect the race."' 29 In conclusion of
law 11, the ALJ suggested that the Commission rescind the penalties
against Pierce, resulting in retaining the
horse as the second-place finisher
30
accordingly.
purse
the
and distributing
"The Commission Staff . . . appealed the PFD to the
Commission.",3 1 After hearing the arguments from both Pierce and the
Staff, the "commissioners voted at the hearing to modify the PFD by
deleting findings of fact 15-18," which concluded that ipratropium did not
enhance the horse's performance.32 The commissioners ruled that these
findings were irrelevant under the Commission's zero-tolerance drug
policy. 33 They also voted to overrule conclusion of law 11, the ALJ's
penalty suggestion.34 However, in the final order the commissioners did not
modify the conclusions35 of fact, only conclusion of law 11, upholding
stewards' ruling in full.
Pierce then appealed to the Trial Court, and the Judge upheld the
Commission's decision. Subsequently, Pierce appealed to the Texas Court
of Appeals.36
IV. COURT'S ANALYSIS

In Piercev. Texas Racing Commission, the Texas Court of Appeals
summarized the issues raised by Appellant as follows:
[i]n two issues, Pierce complains that the Commission's
order prejudiced his substantial rights and violated his
constitutional rights. Within these two issues, Pierce
presents . . . specific complaints related to the order: that
the Commission erred by (1) modifying conclusion of law
11 from what was recommended by the Administrative
Law Judge; (2) punishing Pierce, the owner, more harshly
than the trainer was punished; (3) failing to notify Pierce of
or make Pierce a party to the initial stewards' hearing;

29

Id at 750.

30id.

31 Id.
32 Id.
33 id.

34Id.
at 750.
35
Id.
36

Id. at 750-51.
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[and] (4) improperly shifting the burden of proof to Pierce
at the State Office of Administrative Hearings ....
This Comment addresses each of Appellant's complaints, including the
applicable statutory and constitutional components.
A. Holding
The Texas Court of Appeals affhrmed the Trial Court's order
upholding the penalties of the Texas Racing Commission and rejected each
of Appellant's arguments. Ultimately, the Court held that Pierce received
all of the process due a defendant-owner and that the penalties,
disqualification of the horse, and redistribution of the purse should stand as
imposed by the Commission.38
B. Standardof Review
Notably, the Texas Court of Appeals applied the substantial evidence
review to the Commission's order. The Court explained:
[u]nder this standard, we presume that the Commission's
findings, inferences, conclusions, and decisions are
supported by substantial evidence, and the burden of
proving otherwise rests on the appellant. The
Commission's order may be reversed only if a party's
substantial rights have been prejudiced because the
administrative decisions (1) violate a constitutional or
statutory provision, (2) exceed the agency's authority, (3)
were made through unlawful procedure, (4) are affected by
another error of law, (5) are not reasonably supported by
substantial evidence when considering the reliable and
probative evidence in the record as a whole, or (6) are
arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of
discretion.39

37 Id. at 749. The fifth issue raised by Appellant was that various provisions of the
Commission's rules were unconstitutional. Id. That issue is beyond the scope of this Comment.
"See id at 764.
39Id. at 751 (citations omitted).
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(1) Modification of Conclusion of Law 11
The Court labeled the challenge to conclusion of law 11 "the crux
of Pierce's appeal. 40 The AL's conclusion of law 11 determined that
Pierce's horse should not be disqualified from the second-place finish, and
the purse should not be redistributed because the violation did not affect the
outcome of the race. The Commission ruled contrary to the ALJ.' Pierce
asserted that the Commission's modification of this conclusion "was
arbitrary and capricious, characterized by an abuse of discretion, made
through unlawful procedure, affected by other error of law, in violation of
the Commission's statutory authority, and not supported by substantial
evidence. ' 42 The Court disposed of these claims primarily relying on its
interpretation of the AL's role in the hearings process. The Court applied
Texas Government Code Section 2001.058(e) and concluded that the
Commission complied with the requirements by expressly stating the basis
for modification: the AL's conclusion was inconsistent43 with the
Commission's precedent in enforcing the zero-tolerance policy.
The Court further reasoned that under the broad power granted to
the Commission by the legislature in the Texas Racing Act, the
Commission had discretion to determine the appropriate penalty. 44 A
steward from the Commission presented testimony and evidence at the
SOAH showing that Class 1, 2 or 3 violations (here Class 3), were routinely
penalized by loss of purse. 45 Because the ALJ relied on the harmlessness of
the violation, which is considered irrelevant to a violation under the zerotolerance policy, the Court reasoned that it was not arbitrary or capricious
for the Commission to modify conclusion of law 11. Thus, the Court found
that Pierce's statutory challenge to the modification of conclusion of law 11
was overcome by the Commission's zero-tolerance policy and discretion in
administering penalties.46
Next, Pierce argued that, by modifying conclusion of law 11, the
Commission "violated his constitutional rights of due process and equal
protection by denying him the right to an independent Trier-of-fact. ' 7 The
Court disagreed, citing the "neutral" status of an ALJ as administrative
magistrate and emphasizing that modification or rejection of an AL's
findings by the Commission does not affect this status.4 8
40 id

.
41See id.
at 750.
42

1d. at 751.
id.at 752.
44Id.
45Id.at 753.
4 See id.
47
Id.at 755.
41See

48Id.
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(2) Failureto Punish Owner and Trainer Consistently
Pierce complained that the discrepancy in treatment between him,
the owner, and the trainer, who received a $500 fine and a 15-day
suspension, was "arbitrary and capricious." 49 In support of his argument,
Pierce referred to the statutory provision declaring a trainer an "absolute
ensurer" that the horse had not been administered drugs in violation of the
Act.5 ° The Court held that, as with the modification discussed above, the
discrepancy was not arbitrary and capricious because it was both consistent
with precedent and within the Commission's discretion.'
Pierce further argued that his constitutional rights of due process
and equal protection were violated by the discrepancy in punishment. The
Court reviewed this question of law de novo.52 Rational basis review was
applied to the distinction, so that the discrepancy "was constitutionally
permitted so long as the decision was rationally related to a legitimate state
interest. 53 Because the legitimate state purpose was the deterrence of
doping in horse racing, which promoted the health of the animals
54 and the
integrity of the sport, the Court found no constitutional violation.
(3) FailureTo Provide Notice To Pierce Or Make Him A Party To
Hearing
Pierce's challenge to the failure to provide notice or make him a
party to the stewards' hearing was a constitutional claim of violating his
due process rights, so the Court reviewed the issue de novo.55 "In
determining whether a procedural due process violation has occurred, [the
court applies] a two-part analysis: (1) whether the claimant has a property
interest that is entitled to procedural due process protection; and (2) if so,
what process is due. 56
In addressing the first part of the two-part test, the Court agreed
with the Commission that pursuant to the Act Pierce had no property right
in the purse until the Commission cleared the race for payment and
"because the ability for an owner to participate in racing is not a right but,
instead, a highly regulated privilege. 57 Although the determination that the
purse was not a property right was dispositive of the issue, the Court
49Id. at 756.
50

Id.

"' Id. at 757.
52Id.
53 Id.

541id.

s Id. at 758.
56 Id.
57 Id.

2009-2010]

PIERCE V. TEXAS RACING COMMISSION

concluded that notice in this case was sufficient. The Court addressed the
second part of the test summarily, by referring to the rule that evidence of
an actual notice of a hearing "may defeat the party's claims on appeal for
due process violations. 5 8 Despite Pierce's argument that he was not made
a party to the stewards' hearing, the Court found that since Pierce had
"actual notice of the hearing and an opportunity to appear and defend his
interests, his due process rights were not violated by the stewards' failure to
provide him
written notice of or formally make him a party to the initial
59
hearing.
(4) Shifting Burden of ProofTo Pierce At The SOAH Hearing
Pierce argued that the application of § 307.67(c) of the Texas
Administrative Code resulted in a violation of his constitutional right of due
process by shifting the burden of proof to him at the SOAH hearing. 60 The
Court stated that "[i]n administrative proceedings, due process requires that
'
parties be accorded a full and fair hearing on disputed fact issues. ,
However, the Court explained its conclusion that Pierce had actual notice of
the hearing was dispositive of this issue because the procedure was fair and
because 62"the statute says nothing about an exception for non-participating
parties.,
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASE

Pierce v. Texas Racing Commission demonstrates that racehorse
owners face a heavy burden when placed in the position of defendants in
administrative and judicial proceedings on doping violations.
The
administrative proceedings are marked by a strict adherence to the zerotolerance policy, even when the infraction is merely technical. All parties,
including the Commission, accepted the ALJ's factual finding that the drug
was administered well outside the normal window for effectiveness and
even beyond the period where it would normally have been reflected in the
testing. The most problematic aspect of the Court's review was the strict
approach that it took to Appellant's statutory and constitutional arguments.
Appellant's chief statutory argument was that the agency's record
lacked substantial evidence to support its action. The Court's standard for
substantial evidence was virtually determinative of this argument. The
Court presumed that the agency's decisions were supported by substantial
58Id.
'9

Id. at 759.

60Id. at 760.
61

62

Id. at 760-761.
Id. at 761.
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evidence, and placed the burden on the Appellant to rebut the presumption.
The complex history of this standard shows that it was derived from a very
deferential presumption statutorily granted to one agency, the Railroad
Commission, but since adopted to review actions of all agencies. 63 It is
apparent that this is a heavy burden on the appellant.
The most troubling aspect of the Court's analysis of Appellant's
constitutional issues was the ease with which it disposed of Pierce's due
process claim. The Court accepted the Commission's assertion that
Appellant had no property interest in the purse because it was never
distributed to him. It is established law that due process property interests
are created by state law. 64 This type of proceeding, and particularly the
Commission's argument, demonstrates just how circular the argument
becomes if interpreted literally. The argument made by the Commission,
and accepted by the Texas Court of Appeals - that there can be no property
interest because the state directly controls the property - raises many
concerns about the nature of property. The Court's reasoning suggests that
property right flows from the state. While the full debate is beyond the
scope of this Comment, it suffices to say that this concept of property is in
direct contrast to philosophical views of property, dating back to the
writings of John Locke who implied that property is an intrinsic human
right that does not stem from the government. Here, the acceptance that
property came from the government led the Court to conclude that
Appellant was not deprived of a property right without due process of law
because the state government, which controlled the purse via the
Commission, did not grant him a property right by releasing the purse.
The Court's conclusion that due process was not violated by the
initial stewards' hearing procedure is also troubling. The Court's analysis
was limited to concluding that Pierce had notice and an opportunity to
respond. By doing this, the Court avoided the question on the nature and
timeliness of the notice. Appellant was clearly aware that the hearing was
taking place. It is far less clear that he had actual notice that his rights were
being adjudicated. Unfortunately, the Court ignored Appellant's argument
that his rights could not be affected by the hearing, due to the statutory
declaration of the horse's trainer to be the full insurer of compliance with
doping policies. Instead, the Court took a highly technical and dismissive
approach to the adequacy of the notice. As a result, Appellant was faced
with a heavy burden stemming from a hearing that, unbeknownst to him,
could affect his rights.

63 See

Alamo Express, Inc. v. Union City Transfer, 309 S.W.2d 815, 823-24 (Tex. 1958).

64Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 546, 577 (1972).
65See JAMES TULLY, A DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY: JOHN LOCKE AND HIS ADVERSARIES 104

(1980).
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VI. CONCLUSION

Pierce v. Texas Racing Commission demonstrates to racehorse
owners the practical consequences of a strictly enforced zero-tolerance
doping policy, which arises as a result of great judicial deference to a state
agency that controls the disputed purse. Presumptions against the owner on
appeal and a view of property favoring the state severely limit the owner's
chances of a favorable legal outcome. Specifically, Pierce illustrates that
owners must be vigilant about protecting their rights, either by avoiding
violations altogether, or by getting involved in the earliest stages of the
proceedings.

